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ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the manner in which the civil law sets incentives, given that courts
do not directly observe the activities that the law would hope to control. What distinguishes the civil law
problem from other hidden action problems is that the principal (the court) conditions its rewards and
punishments on signals (evidence presented) of the agents' choosing. Thus unlike the output signal used
by the employer in the classic moral hazard problem, the signal here is itself strategic. The paper
proposes a model that casts the civil law's problem as a combination of moral hazard in the underlying
activity and adverse selection in a second-stage signaling game (the "hearing"), where "types" in the
latter are determined by actions in the former. Types correspond to the difficulty or cost of presenting
various pieces of evidence. By carefully setting its liability per evidence schedule, the court may separate
types in the second stage hearing by the hearing payoffs they receive. Since type is contingent on initial
action, an appropriate separation at the hearing will create the desired incentives in the underlying
activity. After analyzing the basic single agent model with mandatory post-action hearings, the paper
considers multiple parties and voluntary filing of suits.
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It seems intuitive that people take care when others are in danger, not because they are being
monitored by the authorities, but because they are afraid of being sued. The object of this paper
is to advance our formal understanding of this basic idea—namely, the indirect control of
unobserved behavior by threat of liability or promise of recovery at a subsequent hearing.
The "civil law problem" has several distinctive features which make it of both theoretical
and applied interest within the literature on mechanism design. Chief among these is the
strategic nature of the signals upon which rewards and punishments must be conditioned—a
feature which is perhaps best understood with reference to the usual hidden action/moral hazard
problem. There a principal enforces an action that she can not directly observe by making
transfers contingent on observables affected by the agent's hidden choice. Thus, in the canonical
problem the employer induces work effort by making the wage contingent on output, where
output is essentially a noisy signal of employee effort. Like the employer, the civil law (i.e., the
law making authority) attempts to set incentives for behavior that it does not directly observe,
behavior such as the level of precaution exercised in a potentially hazardous activity. But in the
civil law rewards and punishments are conditioned solely on evidence presented in court; and
unlike the inanimate output signal used by the employer, evidence is chosen by the parties in
interest. Thus in the civil law, private actions are enforced based on signals that are themselves
subject to self-interested behavior.
This paper models this feature by combining a moral hazard approach to the underlying
activity with an adverse selection analysis of the subsequent hearing. While hybrid models
abound in the mechanism design literature, what distinguishes the approach taken here—indeed
what drives the results—is that the adverse selection "types" are made endogenous to the moral
hazard actions.1 Thus, the agent's hidden choice (of care, for example) in the underlying activity
1
 One could equivalently define "Type" to be the profile of "types" across hidden actions. This would be to
combine the nature nodes in Figure 2 at the beginning of the tree in Harsanyi fashion and would essentially make
"type" exogenous. In this formulation, what distinguishes the model in this paper from the usual hybrid model is
that the agent chooses her hidden action before learning her type.
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affects her signaling costs in a second stage signaling game resembling Spence's (1974) model of
education—here the signal is evidence, not education, and the transfer is liability, not salary.
The incentive setting mechanic turns on the possibility of finding certain forms of evidence
whose "cost" or difficulty of presentation differs (in a particular manner) according to what
action was taken in the underlying activity. If so, "separating" different types by the payoffs they
receive at the hearing may be used to affect the agent's incentives in the underlying activity.
(See the numerical example in Section 1.1.)
The paper's contribution, then, is three-fold. By explicitly including both the underlying
activity and the subsequent hearing in a single integrated model, it helps to connect the law and
economics of procedure and torts, fields which, despite evident complementarities, remain on the
whole disjoint. Secondly, it makes a formal and somewhat novel assertion about the role and
nature of evidence—that the sort of evidence that we should reward (with either less liability or
more recovery) is that which is relatively likely to be relatively cheap when the agent takes the
action we wish to implement. (These first two contributions to law and economics are discussed
further in the survey contained in Section 1.3.) Thirdly, the paper contributes to the theoretical
literature on mechanism design by analyzing the case of endogenous types in both the single and
multi-party settings with both mandatory and optional participation. (A summary of this analysis
appears in Section 1.2.)
1.1 Numerical Example of Enforcement by Hearing
The basic idea of enforcement by hearing is evident in a simple numerical example.
Suppose, for example, that a risk neutral potential injurer makes the binary choice of whether or
not to be careful, where the effort cost of care is $25 and the consequent reduction in expected
accident costs to victims is $50. Clearly, if the court could see whether the injurer has taken
care, it could induce the injurer to do so by fining her something more than $25 if she does not.
Moreover, even if the court's observation of care is "noisy"—if, for example, the court observes
a signal whenever the injurer is careful, and half the time when the injurer is careless—the court
can still induce the injurer to take care by imposing a fine of something more than $50 whenever
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it does not see the signal. Noisy or clear, the signal in both cases is strategically inanimate. On
this dimension, then, we are still in the world of the canonical moral hazard problem.
Now suppose that the court sees neither care, nor some inanimate, though possibly noisy
signal thereof. The point here is that the court can still enforce care if it can find a piece of
evidence whose "cost" (interpreted broadly) to the injurer decreases in the injurer's care level
faster than the effort cost of care. Suppose, for example, that evidence A costs $200 if the injurer
has been careless and only $100 if the injurer has been careful. Let the court announce—prior to
the injurer's choice of care—that it will impose liability of $150 on the injurer if she fails to
present evidence A at a subsequent "hearing."
If the injurer has taken care, then her "best case" at the hearing will be to present evidence
A: this will save her $150 in liability at a cost of $100 in evidence. If she has been careless, her
best case will be to remain silent: presenting evidence A would cost her $200 and only save her
$150 in liability. Therefore, the hearing-phase payoff from presenting her best case will be -$100
(consisting of the cost of evidence A) if she is careful, compared to -$150 (consisting of her
liability) if she is careless. Since the $50 cost saving at the hearing exceeds the $25 effort cost of
care, she will indeed take care in the underlying activity.
Now suppose there are also two other pieces of evidence, B and C. B costs the injurer $50,
if she is careful and $76 if she is not. C costs the injurer $25 if she is careful and $49 if she is
not. The reader can check that the court can implement care by announcing that it will impose
liability of $75 on any injurer who fails to present evidence B (while presentation of either A or
C will have no effect on liability). This is a more efficient method of inducing care than through
use of evidence A, because the cost of enforcement to society—the signaling cost-is only $50 as
opposed to $100 when evidence A is used. (Liability is a transfer and so washes out of this
simple social welfare calculation.) A similar scheme using C would cost even less—if it worked.
But it will not, since $49-$25<$25. Thus, the cheapest implementation of care uses evidence B
and costs society $50 in costly signaling.
Once we know the minimal cost of implementing care—given that our alternatives are
limited to evidence A, B and C, the minimal cost here is $50—we can decide whether doing so is
worth the trouble. Here, for example, the $50 enforcement cost saves us only $25 when we net
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the $50 dollar reduction in accident costs against the additional $25 effort cost of care. Thus, in
this example, enforcing care is not worthwhile.
1.2 Organization of Paper and Summary of Results
The paper is organized into a procession of four models. The first model, the single agent
model with mandatory hearings, which appears in Section 2, develops the intuition of the
foregoing numerical example in a similar setting in which all agents must come individually to a
subsequent hearing. This model, however, generalizes the numerical example along several
dimensions: 1) there are several alternative actions in the underlying activity and thus the court
must determine what level of care to implement, not whether to enforce care, 2) the agent's
evidence costs in the subsequent hearing are only stochastically determined by her action in the
underlying activity (presumably, e.g., evidence costs will depend on whether an accident actually
occurs), 3) the space of possible pieces of evidence is far richer than the example's three
alternatives.
The single agent, mandatory hearings model is used to make several general points about
enforcement by hearing, points that are independent of endogenous filing decisions and the
presence of multiple competing parties, complications added in later sections.
In Section 2.1.1, it is shown that the requirements for being able to implement any given
level of care are far more stringent for enforcement by hearing than for enforcement by direct
(possibly noisy) observation, as in the canonical principal agent problem. While
implementability in the canonical principal agent problem follows solely from the richness of the
signal space (in particular from a full rank condition on the appropriate probability matrix),
additional conditions on the shape of the distribution will be necessary for enforcement by
hearing. It is shown, for example, that for multiplicatively separable evidence costs (See
equation ( 5 ) and the accompanying text) a given level of care is implementable only if its
distribution does not second order stochastically dominate the distribution for another level of
care that requires less effort from the agent.
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In Section 2.1.2 the least cost liability per evidence schedule implementing each level of
care is characterized under the same functional form assumption, ( 5 ). The schedule turns out to
have a rather simple form. The cost of evidence presented (liability incurred) as a function of
type is an increasing (decreasing) step function with no more steps than the number of levels of
care, however large the number of types (though the steps themselves do not in any sense
correspond to the levels of care).
Section 2.2 moves then to the larger problem of choosing what level of care to enforce,
given that we know the minimal cost of enforcing each. In particular, the change in the
(minimal) cost of enforcement per change in the level of care enforced is decomposed into two
effects: the change in the evidence cost schedule of the presenter and the change in what
evidence is presented. Like the change in demand for a change in own price, the latter effect is
ambiguous while the former is always negative. Thus, contrary to intuition, higher levels of care
"tend" to be less expensive to enforce—when we do so by hearing. This, in turn, implies that
accounting for the costs of enforcement causes us to raise the level of care enforced.
The second of the four models appears Section 3. This model maintains the assumption that
hearings involve only a single agent, but drops the assumption that they are mandatory. Instead,
each agent is given the option of filing for a hearing. It is shown that the presence of fixed
costs—defined to be the cost of showing up at the hearing, apart from the cost of any evidence
presented—makes it advantageous for the court to use the decision to file itself as a signal. With
fixed costs, not filing is the cheapest signal. All else the same, then, a court concerned with the
social cost of enforcement will want to employ this signal as much as possible. It is shown,
however, that all else is not the same: fewer filings turn out to necessitate higher signaling costs
at each hearing that is held, if incentives in the underlying activity are to be maintained. Notably,
this fundamental tradeoff is not present in the existing literature on costly litigation (e.g. Ordover
(1978, 1981) and Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1988), both discussed below in Section 1.3.1. These
papers consider only the fixed component of litigation costs and their results depend on the
consequent phenomenon that the cost of the system depends only on the number of suits.
Sections 4 and 5 take up the issue of multiple parties, the first with mandatory hearings, the
second with filing decisions. In Section 4 it is shown that, subject to a richness-of-signal
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condition similar to what is sufficient for implementability in the canonical principal agent
problem, the presence of multiple parties allows the court to enforce any hidden action profile
(essentially in dominant strategies) for just the fixed cost of attendance for all parties, without
resort to the differential cost signaling discussed in Sections 2 and 3. The basic idea is that the
court can make each agent's liability contingent only the "testimony" (i.e. type reports) of the
other agents. This insures that each agent has no incentive to lie in his testimony and if the other
agents' testimony is a rich enough signal of the action profile, this allows enforcement without
separating agents via costly signaling.
Full extraction of the surplus with correlated types in pure adverse selection models is an
established result. (See Fudenberg and Tirole, p. 293 et seq. for a review). But the result in
Section 4, proven in a model in which types are endogenous to hidden actions, is of separate
theoretical interest: the differing nature of the requisite assumptions on the signal space evidence
the distinction. This is discussed in more detail in Section 4.
The result in Section 4 raises the puzzle of why such a scheme is not seen in practice. The
following section, 5, shows how the puzzle is resolved when filing decisions, as in Section 3, are
introduced into a multi-agent model. Just as with a single agent, higher fixed costs make it
optimal to have fewer types of fewer agents appear. At some point, fixed costs will be large
enough so that it will be optimal to have fewer agents appear than are necessary to engage in the
costless (modulo fixed costs) scheme outlined in Section 4, which—the reader will recall—
requires attendance sufficient to create a rich enough signal of actions in the underlying activity
from opponent types at the hearing. With substantial fixed costs, then, the optimal incentive
scheme will entail a mixture of opponent type reports ("testimony") and own differential cost
signaling—much like our current system.
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1.3 Survey of Existing Literature
1.3.1 The Nexus of Torts and Procedure
The economics analysis of torts and procedure remain for the most part two disjoint
literatures and simply concatenating their separate lessons will not satisfactorily answer the
fundamentally interstitial question which is the focus of this paper.
The economic analysis of torts,2 for one, has done much to advance our understanding of
how legal rules affect incentives. But tort models typically assume that courts can costlessly and
perfectly observe whatever is necessary to implement the liability standard in question. If the
rule is negligence, for instance, the court is assumed to observe whether defendant exercised due
care and, if not, the extent to which plaintiff was harmed as a result (within some margin of
error). The imperfect process by which the court must glean this information—i.e. litigation—is
left unmodeled.
Models of litigation,3 on the other hand, typically take up the civil law problem in media res
with the cause of action already formed. Changes in procedural rules are evaluated in terms of
their affect on litigation specific choices, such as the decision to sue or settle. Analysis of the
impact on incentives in the activity that gave rise to litigation in the first place—e.g., potentially
tortious conduct—is at best implicit.
To be sure, there have been several pioneering attempts integrate the economic analysis of
torts and procedure—in particular, to take account of the cost of litigation in determining optimal
legal rule. Ordover (1978, 1981) studies optimal adjustment of the due care threshold under a
negligence cum contributory negligence standard in the context of bilateral, symmetric accidents
with a fixed cost of litigation. Similarly, Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1988) analyze the optimal
adjustment of damages under strict liability when there is a fixed cost to litigation. Yet, like the
literature on torts, both of these papers assume that care taken and/or harm caused are readily
21 refer to a literature typified by Shavell (1980).
3
 For a review of this literature (excluding some important contributions more recent than the survey itself) see
Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989).
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observable by the court. Correspondingly, these papers impose only a fixed cost to litigation
with no accounting for the variable costs of separation by costly signaling.
1.3.2 The Strategic Analysis of Evidence
A fair portion of the formal literature on evidence investigates applying Bayesian reasoning
to the deductions of fact finding tribunals.4 Such analysis is limited by its neglect of the fact that
the court makes its deductions in litigation and not in the laboratory. Thus, the court in these
pure Bayesian models presumes that the document placed before it is authentic and treats its
existence as an event which may or may not be correlated with the factual assertion whose truth
it must determine. In reality, of course, the court does not observe the existence of an authentic
document; it observes only the event that one of the parties chose to place before it a piece of
paper containing a particular set of commonly understood symbols. The meaning of this event
depends on the strategy and incentives of the party.
There have been two notable attempts to inform evidence law analysis with game theoretic
reasoning. Rubinfeld and Sappington (R&S) (1987), for one, predates this model in casting the
problem as one of mechanism design in which the principal is an imperfectly informed court.
Yet, unlike the present paper, there is only a vague link in R&S between the actions taken in
court and the actions in the primary activity being litigated (in R&S, crime): the court's objective
is to minimize the likelihood of type I and type II errors. Moreover, in R&S's main model,5 the
choices of the party at trial are not evidence-as-publicly-observed-signal, as here, but rather trial
effort-as-hidden action. The deduction of the court regarding the guilt or innocence of the
criminal defendant in R&S is assumed to be affected by trial effort, but in a manner exogenously
determined—once again with an implicitly Bayesian story that does not account for the court's
beliefs about the trial effort strategies of guilty versus innocent defendants.
The second paper, Milgrom and Roberts (1986) shows that 1) an uniformed but strategically
sophisticated principal can effectively induce full disclosure from an informed agent, though the
agent's interests differ from its own and 2) even if the principal is not sophisticated, full
4
 See, e.g., Green (1986).
5
 But see their second best case.
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disclosure will be effectively induced in the presence of multiple agents with divergent interests.
Yet, however striking and influential, the relevance of these results is severely limited by the
authors' critical assumption that, though agents can omit to tell the "whole truth," they can not
lie outright. After all, transcripts of actual litigation abound with contradictory factual
assertions—which would seem to indicate that somebody must be lying.
2. SINGLE AGENT, MANDATORY HEARINGS
A risk neutral agent and a risk neutral principal interact in a model with three phases, as
depicted in Figure 1. To fix ideas we will think of the agent as a potential tort-feasor and the
principal as the court. In the
Promulgation of Law Underlying Activity Hearing first promulgation phase the
principal announces a liability
(per evidence) schedule
/ : £ -»9 t . The schedule tells
the agent how much she must
pay l(e) (or receive) based on
the case or evidence e e E she presents at the hearing, the third phase. As is standard in
mechanism design (and perhaps more warranted when the principal is "the law"), I assume that
the principal is able to precommit to this schedule.
In the second phase, the underlying activity, the agent chooses an action / from the set
{l,..., / } . The agent'sprivate cost for action i is at, where {l,..., /} is arranged so that
al < a2 <...< at. The social cost (excluding the agent's private costs) is ht. We may think of / as
the potential tort-feasor's level of care, a; as her effort cost of care and ht as the {expected) cost
of accidents to third parties.
Some time after her choice of action, the agent appears at a hearing at which she presents the
case e eE of her choice to the principal. In presenting her case, the agent faces an evidence cost
schedule cy.E -> SR+ , defined by Cj(e). The parameter j , which will be referred to hereinafter as
10
Principal Announces Agent Chooses Hidden /igeni Presents Case, e
Liability Schedule, l(e) Action, i
Figure 1
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the agent's hearing type, is drawn probabilistically from the set {l,..., J}, according to a measure
Pt = (pn,...,pu) e^iJ+ , pn+...+Pu = 1 that depends on the agent's choice of/ in the underlying
activity.
The agent's knows her hearing type when choosing what case to present at the hearing, but
not when choosing her action in the underlying activity. The court, on the other hand, observes
neither i ory. The rationality of the players and the structure of the model (including the
probability measures Pt) are common knowledge.
The agent's sequential decision problem for the simple case of two actions, two states and
two cases is depicted in
-l(eWc(e')
FIGURE 2
Choice of Action in Underlying Activity Figure 2. In choosing
what case to present at
the hearing the agent
balances presentation
costs against liability
incurred: if she is of type
j , she chooses her case to
maximize - / (e)-c . (e) .
Stepping backwards to
the underlying activity,
she chooses her action there to balance current effort costs against expected maximal hearing
payoffs.
The principal, on the other hand, chooses the liability schedule l(e) to maximize social
welfare taking into account the maximizing behavior of the agent as just described. Choosing the
liability schedule taking account of the agent's reaction to it—both in the underlying activity and
at the hearing—is the same as choosing an action i and a liability lj and case e} for each type7
under two constraints: a) every type/ (weakly) prefers her own (/,-,£,•) pair to that assigned to
every other type and, b) given that each type/ does in fact present e} and pay /., the agent
11
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prefers to take action /. This equivalence is a standard combination of the revelation principal
and the one-stage deviation principal.6 (See, e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, p. 109, 255.)
Hereinafter, I will refer to (l,e) = (ll,...,lJ;el,...,eJ)e9lJ xEJ rather than l(e) as the liability per
evidence schedule.
Social welfare has three components in this model: the private cost to the agent of the action,
the public cost of the action and the expected cost of the case presented at the hearing by the
agent. Liability payments are transfers and do not enter social welfare. Thus, given i and e,
social welfare is W = -at - ht - The principal's over-all problem is then:






 + ±Plj(-lJ - Cj(ej)) > - a,
-!J-cj(eJ)>-lf-cJ(eJ.) (3 )
2.1 The Minimum Cost of Implementing Action i with Multiplicatively Separable Evidence
Costs
Fix an action / and consider the sub problem of implementing it at minimal cost:
' >1
6
 But note that a perfection requirement is implicitly imposed on the agent's hearing behavior in that the agent is
assumed to optimize at unreached information sets. The perfection requirement has no impact here, however, since
unreached information sets in Figure 2 are unreached solely by virtue of the agent's own choice at a preceding
information set. We may think of the agent's behavior at an unreached information set not as her actual plan, in
which such behavior is of no consequence, but as the court's counterfactual judgment of what the agent would do
were this information set reached.
12
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subject to (2 ) and ( 3 ).
In the remainder of this subsection, 2.1,1 will work with the evidence cost function
Cj(e) = jc(e) ( 5 )
where c:E -> SK+ is assumed to take all of SK+ as its range. Thus, evidence costs for type/ are
always the same fraction of evidence costs for type / > j and the cost difference j'c(e) - jc(e)
ranges from zero to infinity as we vary e over its domain. Note that adding types of zero
probability has no effect on the analysis and so the linearity of evidence costs in type in ( 5 ) is
without loss of generality.7 Lastly, note that ( 5 ) satisfies the single crossing property with
respect to the ordering on E induced by the function c. This evidence cost function is far from
general. Nevertheless, it allows us to make sharp statements about properties that are
qualitatively true in the general case.
2.1.1 Implementability
When, as in the canonical principal agent problem, we enforce the hidden action via direct
observation of a correlated variable, we are free to condition rewards or punishments on that
variable in whatever manner we choose. Consequently, implementability is not an issue.8 If, for
instance that we could observe type (type will play the role of output in the employer problem),
then action i would be implementable so long as we could find type contingent payoffs
V = (V1 , . . . ,V,)G$R' / satisfying V/ = l,...,7, - f l » + ^ 1 W ^ - f l r + E ^ 1 ^ v r Inmatrix
notation this is (P[i]- P)v > a[i] - a where: 1) P is the IxJ matrix whose V * row is Pr, 2)
P[i] is the IxJ matrix all of whose rows are Ps, 3) a is the vector of efforts costs, and 4) a[i]
7
 Since the constraints and the objective are continuous in t and the rational numbers are dense in the reals, all
results continue to hold if we assume that t takes only rational values. We may then write
\t(\),...,tyj)j = a(rl9..., Tj), where each r ( is an integer and a e 9?++ . We then expand the set of types to be
{l,..., Tj}, placing probability zero on all j e {l,..., r y } not included in \tx,..., r_,} . We then redefine the
cost function c to be ac .
8
 Since only differences matter for implementability, addition of the usual participation constraint does not change
this fact. Here there is no participation constraint since the principal, the "law," has the power to compel
appearance and execute judgment.
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is the / -vector all of whose coordinates are a,. Sufficient for the existence of a solution to this
matrix inequality is that P have full row rank.9
In contrast, when we enforce by hearing, we are no longer free to choose any type contingent
payoffs. We have access only to those v = (vj,..., vy) e SR"7 that can be generated as best response
payoffs to some liability per evidence schedule. Correspondingly, the richness of the signal
space is no longer sufficient for implementability.
Suppose, for example, that there are three care levels / = 1,2,3, three types j = 1,2,3, the set
of possible evidence is E = [0,oo), costs are Cj(e) = je, and the effort cost of care is ax = 0,
a2 = 2 and a3 = 3. Suppose, further, that the lowest care level / = 1 leads deterministically to the
highest evidence costs 7 = 3, while / = 2 leads with probability one to j = 2 and / = 3 with
probability one to j = 1. Then P has full row rank and is ordered naturally so that higher levels
of care lead to lower evidence cost schedules. Nevertheless, we cannot implement care level 2.
For if the liability per evidence schedule (Il,l2,l3;el,e2,e3) did implement care level i = 2, then
given compliance with this schedule at the hearing, the agent would have to prefer care level
i = 2 over care levels i = 1,3. Therefore, a2 +12 + 2e2 <a3+ll+el => (l2 + 2e2)-(/ ,+ e, )< 1 and
a2 +12 + 2e2 <ax+l3 + 3e3 => (l3 + 3e3)-(l2+2e2)>2, implying
(l2+2e2)-{ll+el)<(l3+3e3)-(l2+2e2) ( 6 )
But, if /j + ex were the best the agent could do at the hearing as a type j = 1, then, inter alia,
ll+el<l2+e2. Moreover, if /3 + 3e3 were the best she could do as a type j = 3, then
l3 + 3e3 <12+ 3e2. Substituting these inequalities into (6 ) yields (l2 +2e2)- (l2 +e2)
< (l2 + 3e2) - (/2 + 2e2) or, rearranged, e2 < e2.
9
 Full row rank of P implies that the matrix obtained by removing row / from P[f\ - P has full row rank and
hence that the columns of this matrix span SR7"1. An alternative sufficient condition for implementability is that i
puts more weight than any other action on some subset T of types: by rewarding the type-event T sufficiently we
can make / the most attractive action whatever its private costs. Necessary and sufficient for implementability is
that no mixed action of lower private cost has precisely the same type distribution as /. See below for a discussion
of mixed actions.
14
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Unlike the canonical hidden action problem, then, whether a particular action is enforceable
by hearing will turn on the relative sizes of the ai and the relative shapes of the Pi. This general
point takes a particularly striking form for the evidence cost function posited in ( 5 ). In this case
the set of implementable type contingent payoffs—in the sense that there exists some (l,e)
satisfying ( 3 ) such that Vj = -l} - cie\—are those which are non increasing and "convex" in
/ Formally, defining for each (v^..., v,) e SRy the vector of double differences
A2v = (A2v15..., A 2 V,_ I ) = ((vi ~ vi) ~(vi ~ V3)>•••>(VJ-2 - V i ) - (vy-i ~ VMVJ-I ~ VJ)) '
we have:
LEMMA 1 Suppose evidence costs are as in ( 5 ). Then type contingent payoffs (v,,..., v,) e
are implementable with some liability per evidence schedule IF AND ONLY IF
A2v>0.
Proof: Appendix A.
With some manipulation we can write constraints (2 ) and ( 3 ) in terms of the double
differences of type contingent hearing payoffs, to obtain that action i is implementable—in the
sense that there exists some (/,e) satisfying (2 ) and ( 3 )—if and only if we can find type




where G is the IxJ matrix of double cumulatives with 77th element ^ J J A T an<^ ^[*] is the
IxJ matrix all of whose rows are identical and equal to the /* row of G. Having reduced
implementability to the existence of a solution to system ( 7), ( 8 ), we obtain a necessary and
sufficient condition for implementability in terms of "mixed actions" and second order stochastic
15
Chris William Sanchirico Enforcement by Hearing
dominance.10 A mixed action is a probability measure on {l,..., /} .n The private (expected) cost
of mixed action K = (n:l,...,7tI) is n'a , while the type distribution is n'P.
THEOREM 1 If evidence costs are given by ( 5 ), then action i is implementable IF AND
ONLY IF its type distribution Pi does not second order stochastically dominate
the type distribution of a mixed action with strictly lower private costs.
Proof: Applying Farkas' lemma to ( 7 ) and ( 8 ) yields that these have a solution if and only if
there exist no n e 9?', q e 9?+ such that
x'{G[i]-G) + q(l,...,\) = 0 (9)
and
7r'(a[i]-a)>0 (10)
From (10 ) we know that n * 0 and so by dividing by the positive scalar KX-V...-^K1 we may take
n to be a probability measure. Rearranging ( 9 ) and ( 10 ) using the fact that q > 0, we have
that a solution to ( 7 ) and ( 8 ) is equivalent to the non existence of a probability measure n such
that a( > 7c'a and Gi < TT'G . Since the /' th row of G is the double cumulative of the measure
Pv, the latter inequality is equivalent to the statement that Pf second order stochastically
dominates the measure n'G M
10
 Let P = {Pii.-.fPj} and Q = {^l5...,^r2} be probability measures on { l , . . . , / } . Let Gp and GQ be the
vector of double cumulatives of P and Q respectively. (See the main text for the definition of a double
cumulative.) P second order stochastically dominates Q , if GP<GQ. An equivalent, more intuitive definition
is that P can be transformed into Q via a series of probability transfers of two sorts: a) shifts of probability from
high to low values; b) mean preserving spreads. Intuitively, then, Q is both more diffuse and more likely to draw
lower values than P.
11
 Since the agent is an expected utility maximizer she has no positive incentive to use mixed strategies and so we
have not, until this point, included them in the model. They do, however, play a role in the following theorem on
implementability.
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COROLLARY 1 If evidence costs are as in ( 5 ), then care level i is implementable ONLY IF
there is no "pure " action i' < i such that Pt second (a fortiori, first) order
stochastically dominates Pv.
A more easily proven and readily interpreted—but merely sufficient—condition for
implementability is the convexity of private costs in expected type.
COROLLARY 2 If evidence costs are as in ( 5 ), then care level i is implementable, IF there
exists K e $R+ such that for all V = 1,..., / , ai + TZEJ < at, + TtE^j. Moreover,
all care levels are implementable, IF effort cost is a non increasing convex
r . /• i a,—a-, a~, —a, Qi^—a,
function of expected type: —v- — > — — >...> —— — > 0.
EJ-E2J E2J-E3J Ej_xj-Ejj
Proof12: Since c(E) = 9t+, we can find e eE such that c(e) = n. For all j = 1,..., J, set e} - e
and lj=0. Then ( 3 ) is trivially satisfied. Further, for any / ' , -ar + ]T._ Prji-lj ~ Jc(em
= -(a,, + 7iEvj) < -(at + nEj) = -at + ^  M/?,>•("(/• ~ Jc(ej)) • ^ n e second sentence of the
corollary follows easily from the first. •
2.1.2 Characterization of the Minimum Cost Liability per Evidence Schedule
To characterize the minimum cost implementation of actions that are implementable, I
further subdivide the cost minimization problem by considering the minimum cost, given action
/, of implementing any set of feasible type contingent payoffs (vp..., vy) e 5H"7:
' 7=1
v. > - / . , - jc(ef)
12
 The result can be proven from Theorem 1, but is easier to show directly.
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The advantage of proceeding this manner is that the cheapest way to implement feasible type
contingent payoffs (v,,..., v,) e SRJ will be (roughly speaking) to set evidence e} so that evidence
costs cUj) equals the first difference Vj - vj+l. Thus, the cheapest cost implementation of
(vj,..., Vj) e SR"7 will be a simple linear function of its first differences:
LEMMA 2 Suppose that evidence costs are given by ( 5 ) . IF type contingent payoffs
(yl,...,vJ) eSR"7 are implementable, THEN the minimum cost of implementing
them is ^Pyjlvj ~ v>+i) •
Proof: Appendix A.
With some manipulation this minimum cost, j^T . Pijj(vj ~ v7+i) c a n be rewritten in terms of
second differences as ^ . ] ^ y pJkk£?Vj. Thus, by combining with our findings on
implementability, we have thus reduced the problem of implementing action / with minimal cost
to a canonical linear program with decision vector, A2v:
• V V








Using the fact that linear programs
have extreme point solutions, we can
show that the optimal liability per
evidence schedule is a monotonic
step function with no more than /
steps. In particular, the types will be
divided into no more than / intervals
(recall that there are J, not /, types) of
t h e form J* j * j} • All types
within a given interval will present
the same evidence and receive the
same liability. Evidence will be
increasing and liability decreasing
across these intervals. Moreover the
lowest interval of types will present no evidence. This is depicted schematically in Figure 3.
Note that step / has no particular relationship to action i. Formally,
THEOREM 2 For one (generically, for all) of the liability per evidence schedules
(/,,...,/,;e,,..., e,) e SR"7 x isy implementing action i at minimal cost, there exists an I-
cell interval partition of the types jQ=\< j \ < j \ <...< j l such that all types in each
cell [./,_!, y',] that have positive probability under Pt present evidence of the same cost
and incur the same level of liability: i.e. Vi = 1,..., / , V / , / e[yM,y ;], lj = lf = /, and
eye A = c(ef) = cr Moreover, /. is decreasing and ci is increasing in i and types in
the lowest cell [jo,j\] present evidence of zero cost. Further, if c:E -> SR+ is one to
one then all positive probability types in each cell [yM,y,-] present the same evidence:
i.e. ,.], ej=ef=ei.
Proof: An optimum (generically, the unique optimum) (vj*,..., v)) of the linear program ( 14 ), (
7 ) and ( 8 ), supposing that one exists, will be at an extreme point of the convex feasible set
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determined by ( 7 ) and ( 8 ). Therefore, the number binding constraints with (v*,..., v)) must be
no less than J -1. There being / constraints in ( 7 ), the number of binding constraints in ( 8 )
must be then no less than J-l-I. This means that the number ofnon binding constraints in ( 8
) must be no more than (J -1) - ((J -1) - / ) = / . Thus are no more than / distinct first
differences in (vj*,..., v)). According to the proof of Lemma 2, in the minimum cost
implementation of the optimal hearing payoffs (v*,..., v^), a positive probability type j <J
presents evidence with cost equal to the first difference v* - v*+1. Hence, among the positive
probability types, there are no more than I distinct evidence costs and if c is one-to-one, no more
than / different pieces of evidence. As is standard, evidence costs must be increasing in type and
so types which present the same evidence must be adjacent. Lastly, it is clear from ( 3 ) that two
types with the same evidence costs must incur the same liability.*
Capitalizing on the linear structure of the program, Appendix C contains an illustrated and
fully solved example of cost minimizing implementation. Appendix B considers the special case
in which types are deterministically determined by actions in the underlying activity.
2.2 Why Higher Levels of Care Tend to be Cheaper to Enforce when Enforcement is by
Hearing.
An important property of enforcement by hearing is that the cost of enforcement tends to
decrease in the private cost of the action being enforced. Somewhat surprisingly, then, more care
tends to be cheaper to implement.
The reason for, and meaning of this "tendency" is roughly as follows. When we change the
action being implemented, two things cause minimum implementation costs to change. First, we
reoptimize our choice of liability per evidence schedule and so we change the cases presented.
And secondly, we change the likelihood of each given type and so we change the expected
presenter. Like the income effect in consumer demand, the first effect is ambiguous (though I
provide single crossing conditions below that allow it to be signed—conditions satisfied by ( 5 )).
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However, like the substitution effect, the latter effect is unambiguous in acting to make higher
levels of care cheaper to enforce, no matter what the evidence cost structure. The intuition is that
if we fix the liability per evidence schedule and reduce the care level of the agent, expected
evidence costs must increase, for it was the fact that less care tended to result in higher evidence
costs that allowed us to enforce the higher level of care in the first place.
This tendency has important implications for the principal's over all problem, (1 )-( 3 ). If,
for example, the minimum cost of implementation were downward sloping "everywhere,13" the
second best level of care (chosen to minimize both the Calabresian costs of accidents ai + ht and
the minimum cost of enforcing each action i) would exceed the first best (chosen to minimize
just the Calabresian costs): at lower levels of care both the Calabresian costs and the minimum
cost of enforcement would exceed that at the first best.
The formalization of this argument presupposes that the agent knows what his type would
have been—given his observation of the resolution of all relevant external uncertainty—had he
taken another action in the underlying activity. To make this formal, let us now suppose that the
agent's hearing type is a function of both his action i and the state of the world s e {l,...,S}. The
state, s, captures all relevant factors not affected by the agent's choice of/. If action i represents
how carefully the agent was driving, s would include, for example, whether a child's ball rolls
out into the street. We will write c(i,s)(e) for the evidence cost function of an agent who has
taken action /, when the state of the world is s. Similarly, we will write l(i,s) and e(i,s) for the
liability and evidence intended for the type corresponding to (j,s) and ps for the probability of
state s. (Thus, ptj = J ] /. v Ps )• With this notation we may define the expected cost of a
particular state contingent evidence profile e = (ex,...,es)eEs for each action i,
Next we decompose the change in implementation costs into two parts and attempt to sign
each. Suppose that l\e* implements / at minimum cost and I*,e* implements i at minimum
13
 Indeed, it could not be downward sloping everywhere, since the cost of enforcing the lowest level of care is
always zero.
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cost. These liability schedules induce some state contingent case profiles, e* and e*, where
es = e*(i,s) and e*s = e*(i,s\. The difference in implementation costs in moving from i to i is
then c;(e*) - cj(e*) • This is evidently decomposable into a change in case presenter component,
ci (e*) - c, (e*) and a change in presented case component, c~. (e*) - c~. (e*).
THEOREM 3 If liability schedule l*,e* implements action i>\ at minimum cost, and I ,e
implements the less privately costly action i < i at minimum cost, then in moving
from i to i, the change in case presenter component c,.(e*)-c*(e*) of the full
change in implementation costs is strictly negative.
P r o o f : S i n c e l*,e* i m p l e m e n t s a c t i o n i > \ o v e r a c t i o n i < z , w e h a v e
S=\
and \/s = l,...,S,





- Z ^ r ^ M - c(i,sy(i,syj -^Psi-fihs) - c(i,s)e*(i,s))
s=l s=l
A*> s)e\^s) - Z Psc(j' sY (*"'s)
s=\ s=\
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This result establishes that the change in presenter effect is always negative. The change in
case presented, on the other hand, is ambiguous in sign. However, when the cost functions
satisfy a particular "single-crossing property," it always positive and thus opposite in sign from
the change in presenter's cost. The property is defined not with respect to the ordering of case
costs by type at the hearing, but rather the ordering of expected costs of state contingent case
profiles by action. Let us say that the cost functions lc(i, s): E -> 9t+ / e {l,..., / } , s e {l,..., £}J
satisfy the single crossing property if i < i and c,(e) > c.(e') imply
c,(e)-c i(e)>c,(e')-c,(e') (16)
This property says that the more expensive the evidence plan e, the greater the cost savings
(possibly negative) from taking more costly actions. A stronger version of this assumption is as
follows, the cost functions lc(i,s):E -» $R+ / e{!,...,I],s e{l,...,£}} satisfy the state-by-state
single crossing property if \fs e{l,...,»S}, i <i and c(iis)(e)>cli,s)(e') imply
c(i,s)(e) - c(i,s)(e) > c[i9s)(ef) - c(i,s)(e') ( 17)
The functional form ( 5 ) satisfies this state by state property. While it is standard in the
literature to assume some sort of single-crossing property, such assumptions are not necessary for
implementability. Neither could they be described as mere "regularity" conditions. Hence, the
following theorem signing the change of case presented, lacks the universality of its predecessor.
THEOREM 4 If the single crossing property holds, liability schedule l\e implements action
i>\ at minimum cost, and I ,e implements the less privately costly action i < i
at minimum cost, then in moving from i to i, the change in case presenter
component c,(e*) - c,(e*) of the full change in implementation costs is non
negative.
Proof: From ( 1 5 ) ,
23
Chris William Sanchirico Enforcement by Hearing
a , - ^ . (18)
Similarly,
c / (« ' ) - c?(0 **?-*/• (19)
Combining ( 18 ) and ( 19 ) yields
c / ( e * ) - c / ( e > c / ( ^ ) - C ' ( ^ ) - (20)
This with the contrapositive of the single crossing property, (15 ), implies
Cj(e)-c,(e)zOM (21)
3. FIXED COSTS AND FILING DECISIONS IN THE SINGLE AGENT MODEL
In the previous section's model, all types/ appeared in court. If the cost of enforcement
consisted solely of the "variable cost" of evidence presented in court, it would be the same to
society to have the agent to arrive at the hearing and present no evidence as to have the agent not
arrive at all. But when simply showing up at the hearing imposes a cost—as it undoubtedly
does—this equivalence dissolves and, all else the same, the court will wish to enforce care with
as few appearances as possible. Consequently, and in accordance with actual civil process, it
will now pay to introduce a new dimension to the court's incentive setting mechanism, the
decision of whether to file a case. Instead of requiring all types to appear periodically, the court
can do better by making hearing attendance optional.14 The idea is to set the liability per
evidence schedule so that the act of filing is itself a signal of the agent's type.
The advantage of using filing itself as a signal is that, with fixed costs, it is relatively
cheap—"not filing" is now the only signal which entails no cost whatsoever, fixed or "variable."
14
 With fixed costs there may also be some advantage to randomizing appearances. Thus, in the previous mandatory
hearing model, with certain parameter values, the court can lower costs by randomly choosing some fraction of the
population to appear. However, with the cost function (4 ), half the number of hearings will mean twice the cost
for each hearing that is held and there will thus be no advantage to randomization. In what follows, I do not
consider random mechanisms.
24
Chris William Sanchirico Enforcement by Hearing
The disadvantage is that it is a fairly blunt instrument: all types that are induced to send the
signal of not filing must get the same (zero) payoffs. This means that the fewer types we induce
to file, the more we must separate types that do file at the hearing in order to create sufficient
incentives in the underlying activity; and more separation means higher variable costs at the
hearing. This tradeoff—between the fixed and variable costs of litigation—does not appear in
prior models of costly litigation such as Ordover (1978, 1981) and Polinsky and Rubinfeld
(1988), in which the only costs to litigation are fixed.
Formally, denote the new hearing-attendance coordinate of the mechanism as a J-vector of
" I V and "O's," / e{0,1} , where fj = l means that the agent files for a hearing when she is of
type/. The full mechanism is now (f,l,e).
I account for fixed costs in the following manner. First, I assume that there is a do nothing
case, eQ e E whose cost is identical and minimal for all types/. Formally, V/,/ ' = 1,..., J,
c = Cj(eQ) = mincfe) = mincf(e) = cf(eQ). The cost c is the cost to each type of showing up at
the hearing and presenting nothing. This includes among other things the opportunity cost of the
agent's time and the cost (to the agent) of the subway ride to city hall. In order to do
comparative statics on this fixed cost, I separate it out from total evidence costs and write
Cj(e) = gj(e) + c for each type/. (Thus, fixed costs for the agent were present in the previous
section, and all I have done here is to make them explicit in the notation.) I also add a new fixed
cost c , not born in the first instance by the agent, representing the fixed cost of the hearing to the
state—this would include the cost of renting the room and dry cleaning the robes. Total fixed
costs are denoted C = c + c . Thus, the cost minimizing implementation of action /, formerly
given by (4 ), (2 ) and ( 3 ) in Section 2.1, is now:
ck1)) (22)
subject to
-«. - ±P.fj{-lj - cj{ej)) * -a,, -tprjfji-lj ~cj{ej)) (23)7=1 7=1
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(24)
Note that setting fj; = 1, Vy = 1,..., J in (22 )-(24) yields the mandatory hearings problem (
2 )-(4) in Section 2.1.
There are, in principal, two ways in which endogenous filing—i.e., allowing / to be either 0
or 1—might affect the solution to the cost minimization problem. The first is that it might make
expand the set of implementable type contingent hearing payoffs, where these are now defined to
include the filing decision: Vj = fjl—lj - cj(ej)) • The second is that use of endogenous filing
might decrease the cost of implementing any given set of implementable type contingent payoffs.
The first thing to note, then, is that given the existence of a do nothing case, the set of
implementable type contingent payoffs does not in fact change. The idea is that we can always
have non filers attend the hearing, present do nothing evidence and receive liability equal to their
cost of doing so, the fixed cost of attendance. This is a well-defined change since do nothing
evidence costs all non filers the same. Assuming truth telling, then, all types receive the same
hearing payoffs under this new scheme as under the old—in particular, non filers still end up
with zero. The rest of the proof entails showing that truth telling is still incentive compatible.
This too relies on the fact that the cost of do nothing evidence is the same across all agents. For
instance, a filer who pretends to be a non filer presents do nothing evidence and receives some
amount of negative liability as compensation for the cost of doing so. This liability has been set
so that the non filers net out to zero when presenting do nothing evidence. Because do nothing
evidence costs the filer the same as the non filer, the filer will also end up with the zero payoffs.
But this can not be better for her than truth telling, since she could always have obtained zero
payoffs under the old mechanism by choosing not to file (unless there were no non filers there, in
which case the result is trivial from the start).
LEMMA 3 Given the existence of a do nothing case, the set of implementable type contingent
payoffs, hence the set of implementable actions, is the same with endogenous filings
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as with mandatory hearings.
Proof: Suppose that (fj,e) implements (vl,...,vJ) G^RJ . Consider the alternative liability per
evidence schedule (/',/',«?') defined by: Vy = 1,..., J, fj = \; V; = \,...,J with /). = 1, e) = ej
and Vj - lj; and \fj = 1,..., J with f.,= 0, ej. = e0 and /J. = -c = -Cj(e0). First,
/•[-I] - cj(ej)) = vj> V/ = !»—»•/» for if /j- = 1»then nothing has changed, and if fj =0, then
vy = o=c-c,(« i,) = /J'(-;;-c;(«;)). second, Y / , / = I , . . . ,J , /y(-/y-cy
- ff\h' ~cj(ej'))' s m c e : ^ /) = //' = 1 ' m e n nothing has changed; if fj = 0 and f., -1, then
then /'{-!• -Cy(e;)) = / ,(-/ , -c,(e,)) > /,.(-/,. -Cj(e,)) = 0 = (c-c,^)) = /;(-/> -c,(e}));
and finally, if fj =ff=0, then /;(-/; -cfc)) = fj(-lj -cfa)) = 0 = c-Cj(e0)
= ff(-l>,-cJ(e>,))M
But while the set of implementable type contingent payoffs does not change with
endogenous filing, the cheapest cost implementation will differ according to the size of fixed
costs. With no fixed costs, there is, trivially, no difference. As fixed costs increase, fewer agents
will be induced to file for a hearing and each hearing that is held will be more expensive. At
some point, when fixed costs are sufficiently large, care level / will be enforced with the
minimum number of appearances under which it is still implementable. The following theorem
substantiates and formalizes these claims. The main idea of the proof is illustrated in Figure 4.
Given the mechanism (f,l,e) and the action /, I will say that variable costs are
>*>*) = Ylj-\P\ifjS]{ej) a n d appearances are P(f,e,i) = YlMPvfj •
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LEMMA 4 If ( / , U e) implements action i at minimal cost when total appearance costs are C
and (f',l',e') implements action i at minimal cost when total appearance costs are
C>C, then V(f,e,i)<V(f\e',i) and P(f,e,i)>P(f',ef,i). If either (f,l,e) or
(/ ' , / ' , e') is not a least cost implementation given the other's total appearance
costs, then V(f,e,i)<V(f',e',i) and P(f,e,i)>P(f',e',i).
IfC = 0, then (f,l,e) minimizes variable costs among all the mechanisms
implementing action i with any level of appearance costs c for the agent.
If C is sufficiently large, then ( / ' , / ' , e') minimizes appearances among all the
mechanisms implementing action i with any level of appearance costs c for the
agent.
Proof: First, I claim that if ( / , e) implements action i (in (23 ) and (24 )) with some / for some
fixed costs (c,k), then (f,e) implements action i with some /' for all fixed costs (c',kf). The
idea is to translate the liability schedule by the change in the agent's fixed costs. Formally,
setting l' = l + c-c',we have: V / , / =1,...,J, /}(-/.;-(gf(ej) + cf)
= fj(-(lJ+c-c')-(gf(eJ) + c')) =fJ(-rj-(gf(ej) + c')). From this it follows that (/>,/ ')
satisfy (23 ) and ( 24 ).
Now consider solving the cost minimization problem (22 )-(24 ) with the filing pattern
constrained to be some arbitrary / . I claim that if e{f) solves this problem (there may be no
solution with any particular / ) with some / when fixed costs are (c, k), then for all fixed costs
(c', k'), there is some /' with which e(f) solves this problem. The claim proven in the previous
paragraph implies that, fixing / , the set of e satisfying ( 23 ) and (24 ) with some / is invariant
with respect to fixed costs (c,k). The claim of this paragraph is then proven once it is noted that
the objective (22 ), as a function of (l,e)—with / fixed—is merely translated by changes in
fixed costs (c, k).
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Thus, if (/(/), e(/)) solves the cost minimization problem (22 )-(24 ) with the filing
pattern constrained to be some arbitrarily chosen / , let V(f) = ^  -xPijffij\?j) denote the
variable cost of this solution, which we now know to be independent of (c, k). Letting
P(f) - X - Pijfj denote t n e probability of filing under filing pattern / , the minimal cost of
implementing action i, given filing pattern / , is then V(f) + CP(f), where C = c + k .
Now allow / to vary. Optimality of (fj,e) for total fixed costs C implies
V{f) + CP(f) < V(f') + CP(f') (25 )
while optimality of (/',/',e') for C implies
V{f) + CP(f') < V(f) + CP(f) (26)
Adding ( 26 ) and ( 25 ) yields
0. (27)
Since C<C , P(f) > P(f'). Substituting this back into (25 ) yields V(f') > V(f). If either (
25 ) or (25 ) hold with strict inequality, then P(f) > P(f') and so V(f') > V(f).
That ( / , /, e) minimizes variable costs among all mechanism implementing action / with any
appearance costs c for the agent is trivial from (25 ). To see that (f',l',ef) minimizes
appearances for large enough C, suppose that there was a filing pattern / " with smaller
appearances, P(f') > P(f") under which action i was implementable. Then the additional cost
of implementing action /with / " would be V(f") + CT(/") - (V(f') + CP(f')) =
{V{f") - V(f')) - C(P(f) - P(f"j), which for large enough C is negative."
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Optimal variable costs and
appearances for C must
be in this region.





This result says that as we increase fixed costs the optimal filing pattern changes such that
the probability of the agent appearing decreases. Interestingly, this result does not say that the
new lower probability subset of filing types is contained in the former higher probability subset
of filing types and this is not generally the case. As fixed costs increase, we may induce some
new types to file as we are simultaneously inducing some currently filing types to simply stay
home. All we know is that on net, "fewer" types will file (in terms of their probability weights).
However, there are circumstances under which optimal filing patterns will be ordered by
containment. These are given in Lemma 5 and Corollary 4. But first, I provide an example
where filing patterns are not so ordered.
In this example, there are two actions / = 1,2 with ax = 0, a2 = f and four types j = 1,2,3,4 .
The set of evidence corresponds to the non negative real line 91+. Evidence costs for the type 4
are c4(e) = 20e and for type 3 are c3(e) = e. Costs for types 1 and 2 are equal: they are 0 for
e < j and then 10 for e > {. Notice that e = 0 is do nothing evidence and there are no fixed
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costs for the agent. These cost functions do not, however, satisfy the single crossing property,
since the difference between costs for 2 and 3 is not monotone in e. If the agent takes action 1,
there is a probability 1 of being a type 4. Given action 2, there is an equal chance of types 1, 2, 3
or 4. I will show that the cheapest implementation of action 2 entails court appearances by only
types 1 and 2 when fixed costs are low and only type 3 when fixed costs are high. Thus, the
probability of appearances in the optimal mechanism decreases as fixed costs increase, but the
subset of types that appear does not decrease in the containment order. Viewing this result solely
from the perspective of type 3, then, we have the curious result that 3 appears in the optimal
mechanism only when doing so is sufficiently costly.
We can implement action 2 with an appearance only by type 3. We set f3 = 1, e3 = {,
l3 = -2-f, and / = f2 = /4 = 0. (We need not specify evidence and liability for types that do not
appear.) Then type 2 tells her true type at the hearing to obtain a reward of 2-f at a cost in
evidence of c3(2) = {. Since e3 = { costs types 1,2, and 4 more than 2-f, they will not file for a
hearing. Expected hearing payoffs following action 2 are then }(2{ - f) = \(2) = | . Following
action 1, they are 0, Hence, the agent will have an incentive to incur the additional private costs,
| , of action 2. The variable cost of this implementation is {(f) = ^ . The fixed cost is } k.
The implementation, f3 = 1, e3 = {, l3 = -2 f, fx = f2 = /4 = 0, is indeed uniquely cheapest
in variable cost given that fixed costs are no greater than }&. The latter constraint implies that
only one type appears. We can not have only type 4 appear: since type 4's evidence costs are
always greater than that of the other types, any I4,e4 inducing 4 to appear and thus yielding non
negative payoffs for 4 would yield strictly positive payoffs for the other types if they pretend to
be 4. Accordingly, the other types would have to obtain strictly positive payoffs by telling the
truth, and this can only be accomplished if we have them appear. Less clear is that having only
type 1 or type 2 appear incurs higher variable costs than having just type 3 appear. Suppose, for
example, that we have only type 1 appear. Since 3 is not appearing -/, - c3(ex) = -ll-el<0
=> ex > - / j . Furthermore, when only type 1 appears, the expected hearing payoff from action 2 is
| ( - / j - cx(e^ and 0 from action 1. To induce the agent to take action 2, it must be that
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}(-/j - Cj(ej)) > f => -/, - cx(ex) > \ . Combining with el > -/, yields ex - cx(ex) > § . Given the
cost structure for type 1, this is only possible at large values of ex, values larger than f, and so
values which cost type 110, not 0.
We can also implement action 2 with appearances by both type 1 and 2 and no other type.
We set fx = f2 = 1, /, = l2 = -1 and ex = e2 = f, and /3 = /4 = 0. Then types 1 and 2 will tell
their true types to get the reward (negative liability) of 1 at an evidence cost of 0 (since f < f) .
And types 3 and 4 will not pretend to be type 1 or 2, since this same reward of 1 would cost them
f and 20(|) = 20 f respectively. Further, given truth telling at the hearing, the hearing payoff
from choosing the higher action is \ , while the hearing payoff from choosing the lower action is
0. Thus it pays to incur the extra private costs of \ for the higher action. Given (ej,...,e4) and
the evidence cost functions, the variable cost of this implementation is 0 and the total cost is \k.
Hence, compared to the first implementation we considered, wherein only types 1 and 2 appear,
variable costs here are lower and fixed costs are higher.
The implementation / = f2 = 1, lx = 12 = - 1 , el=e2=j, and /3 = /4 = 0 of action 2 is
indeed uniquely cheapest in variable costs among those implementations whose fixed costs are
no greater than \ k. We have already seen that the implementation with only one type appearing
has positive variable costs, rather than 0. Further, we could not couple type 4 with just one other
type, since, as explained above, if type 4 appears, all types must appear. It remains, then, only to
show that it is either more expensive or impossible to implement action 2 with appearances by
type 3 and one of type 1 or 2. Suppose, for instance, that we implement action 2 with
appearances by 1 and 3. This can only have zero variable costs, if type 3 is presenting e3 = 0.
But then liability for type 3 must also be 0, for otherwise, types 2 and 4 will want to appear.
Further, type 1 must also be getting exactly 0 hearing payoffs, for otherwise, type 2, her twin,
will want to appear. Then expected hearing payoffs from action 2 and 1 are equal (at zero) and
so action 2 is not implemented.
Now we can not reduce fixed costs strictly below \ k, for this would mean that no type
appeared and so there would be no incentive to take action 2. Further, variable costs can not go
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below 0 and so allowing for fixed costs strictly above | k does not reduce variable costs.
Therefore, we know that the real choice is between implementing with fixed costs at \ k and
variable costs at ^ , as in the first implementation we examined, or with fixed costs at \ k and
variable costs at 0. Which of these alternative we choose depends on the size of A: if k > {, then
the optimal implementation is the first implementation in which only type 3 appears; if k < {,
then we should have both type 1 and 2 appear. We see, therefore, that though we respond to
higher fixed costs with a lower probability that the agent will appear, the lower probability set of
types is not necessarily contained in the higher.
LEMMA 5 If Cj(e) < cf(e),for all e eE, total appearance costs C are positive, and pif > 0,
then (/ , / ,e) implements action i at minimal cost ONLY IF f} > f.,.
Proof: Suppose that f} = 0 and ff = 1, then by ( 24 ), / must get more by telling the truth than
by pretending to bey and not coming to the hearing: -ly - cf (ef) > 0. But/ must get more not
coming to the hearing, than pretending to be / : 0 = fi-lj - cj(ej)) ^ -(,- - cj(ef) • By
assumption, it costs/ no more to present j ' 's evidence and so: -lf - Cj(ef) > -lf - cflef).
Combining, we have -lf - cflef) = 0. But then we can implement action i by inducing type j '
not to appear. Type j ' will still have no incentive to announce that she is of another type since
her truth telling payoffs have not changed. No other type will have and incentive to announce
that she is type j ' since this would lead to the same as announcing/, for which there must be no
positive incentive. Thus, constraint (24 ) continues to hold. Constraint (23 ) also holds, since
type contingent hearing payoffs are unchanged. However, this implementation of action / is less
costly: variable cost can not increase and since C and pif are positive, fixed costs fall. This
contradicts, that (f,l,e) implements action / at minimal cost.B
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COROLLARY 3 Suppose that V'e e E, Cj(e) is non decreasing in j . If(f,l,e) implements
action i at minimal cost when total appearance costs are C and (/',/ ',e')
implements action i at minimal cost when total appearance costs are C > C,
then any type appearing in the filing pattern f appears as well in f: i.e.,
ptj > 0 implies f} > fj
Proof: Suppose, on the contrary, that for some j with ptJ > 0, we have f} = 0 and fj -1. Then
by Lemma 5, / ' > l,...,l,0,...,0 . On the other hand, Lemma 5 implies that there must be no
\T )
positive probability type k > j such that fk = 1. Since ptj > 0, this implies that
P(f) = Tlj^Piifj > YlMPijfj = P(f)' w h i c h contradicts Lemma 4.B
COROLLARY 4 Suppose that there exists a do nothing evidence eQ e E and evidence costs obey
the single crossing property—i.e., there exists some complete ordering >- Efor
which e0 is a smallest element (e.g. that induced by the cost function of some
type) and such that e >- e' and j > f implies Cj(e) - cf(e) > Cj(e') - cf(e').
Then the result in the second sentence of Corollary 3 holds.
Proof: It is trivial to show that the existence of do nothing evidence and the single-crossing
property imply the first sentence of Corollary 3.B
4. MULTI-AGENT, MANDATORY HEARINGS
In the previous section I altered the single agent mandatory hearing model by making
hearing attendance optional. In this section I return to the world of mandatory hearings but add
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the presence of multiple parties. (Section 5 considers both optional hearings and multiple
parties.)
The results in this section might be interpreted as a confirmation—albeit formalized and
distilled—of the viability of the adversarial process. For with multiple parties we can implement
any action in serially undominated strategies at zero (variable) cost under the not too stringent
condition that the hearing types of other agents are a rich enough signal of actions taken by all in
the underlying activity. The basic idea is to make each agent's liability payment depend only on
what the other agents tell us at the hearing. In this way, no agent has an incentive to lie at the
hearing about her true type; consequently, it is as if we observe the profile of agents' types
directly and at zero cost. As in the canonical principal agent problem, then, if this signal is rich
enough, we can use it to implement actions in the underlying activity. In particular, we will not
need to resort to costly signaling—beyond the cost of the do nothing case, i.e. fixed costs.
This result invokes, but differs from, two other classic first best results in the mechanism
design literature: the Groves mechanism and mechanisms with correlated types. In the Groves-
mechanism (See, e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), p. 271, et seq.) we implement the first best
outcome in dominant strategies by setting the decision equal to the first best assuming that
agent's reports are truthful and setting each agent's transfer equal to the sum of his opponent's
payoffs with this naive decision. The Groves Mechanism requires that the principal's
preferences are represented by the sum of the agents utilities from the decision. Such is the case
in the evidence cost minimization problem with fixed /, since the court's payoffs are the inverse
of the sum of evidence costs. Indeed, the Groves mechanism here is trivial since the first best is
the same across all true type profiles: whatever the report profile, we have all agents present the
do nothing evidence, e0 and transfer are set the resulting opponent payoffs. Of course, this
mechanism fails in this problem, for a reason that corresponds precisely to the difference
between the pure adverse selection problem studied by Groves and the hybrid problem analyzed
here: namely the presence of the additional constraint that action i be implemented. Accordingly,
the first best result here requires an additional restriction not found in the Groves mechanism
literature: that a particular probability matrix (see discussion preceding Theorem 5) have full
row rank.
35
Chris William Sanchirico Enforcement by Hearing
Another thread in the literature exploits correlation among agents' types in order to generate
first best implementation (See, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, p. 292, et seq.). Thus Cremer and
McClean (1985, 1988), for example, show how, when opponent types are a rich enough signal of
own type we can "tweak" the Vickrey auction to get each player not only to report his own true
type, but also to cause payment of the highest, rather than the second highest value on average.
The basic idea is to use opponent type reports to translate the type contingent decision schedule
of each agent in such a way that on average, the agent's participation constraint binds. In this
paper, we are also concerned with the quality of opponent types as a signal. But here we need
opponent types to be a rich enough signal of actions, indeed the full profile of own and opponent
actions, rather than own type as in Cremer and McClean (1985, 1988). Moreover, we do not use
opponent type reports to translate a separating schedule as in Cremer and McClean (1988), but
rather in lieu of the costly separating schedule.
In the remainder of this section I focus only on the cost minimizing implementation of a
given level of care. I show that it will be zero for every level of care and so in the overall
problem, the court will implement the first best care profile.
4.1 The Model
There are now K agents. We seek to enforce the action profile15 i el = {l,...,x¥] . This
action profile stochastically determines a type profile j e J = {l,...,<D} at a subsequent hearing
according to the measure P(i) = (p(i)(j)) , where all p(i)(j) ^ 0 and ^ . p(i)(j) = 1.
As in Section 2, the single agent model with mandatory hearings, the model here has three
phases. In the promulgation phase, the principal announces for each profile of hearing types
j e J, a liability vector /(/) = (f\{j\—Jk{j)) e $lK and an evidence vector
e(j) = (ex(j),...,eK(j)) e EK. In the second phase, the underlying activity, the agents
15
 There is no loss of generality in assuming that all agents have the same number of possible actions, since
"dummy" actions may be added to the list of possible actions for agents whose number of possible actions is less
than the maximum number across all agents..
36
Chris William Sanchirico Enforcement by Hearing
simultaneously choose their private actions, thus yielding a profile i = (il,..., ik) e {l,...,/} .
Nature then determines a type profile j e J according to the measure Pi. In the last phase, the
agents all attend a mandatory hearing at which they simultaneously announce their respective
types. In choosing what to announce at the hearing, each agent knows only her own private
action and her own type (but see remark below). Evidence and liability and then determined
according to the schedules announced in promulgation. The measures P[i) are common
knowledge.
Thus each agent k has two types of information sets in the game fixed by a particular
(/(/), e(y")). . At the first, denoted 0k, agent k chooses her action in the underlying activity.
The second type of information set is a hearing information set, denoted (ik,jk) and represents
agent &'s choice of announcement at the hearing following her having taken action ik and
become a type j k . Thus a strategy sk for agent k consists of an action choice sk(0k) e{l,...,|/|}
and a map sk(ik,jk) \-> [l,...,\j\], specifying an announcement at each hearing information set
(w*)-
4.1.1 Generality of Intra-Agent Information Structure
The model is formally structured so that the agents condition their announcement of type at
the hearing only on their own private actions and their own types. Yet, because we are free to
choose the (Pj)iel, the model is general enough to accommodate all possible assumptions about
each agent's knowledge of his opponents' actions and types. If, for instance, there is for each
agent a one to one correspondence between the set of action profiles and that agent's set of
possible types and each Pt puts probability one on the type profile consisting of the type for each
agent corresponding to that action profile, then each agent effectively knows his opponents'
actions and types just by observing his own type.
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4.2 Form of Implementation
I consider two forms of implementation. Each form has two conditions corresponding to the
two types of information sets identified above. Let us say that a particular action profile / is
implemented in equilibrium if: E2) at each hearing (i,j), no agent has an incentive to lie about
her type, if she believes that her opponents always announce their true types, and El) given that
she and her opponents will announce their true types at the subsequent hearing, no agent has an





Action profile i is implemented in iterated dominance if: D2) at each hearing (i,j) no agent
has an incentive to lie about her type, no matter what she believes her opponents will announce,
and Dl) given that she and her opponents will announce their true types at the subsequent
hearing, no agent has an incentive to deviate from the implemented action, no matter what
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By a standard argument,16 (D2) is the same as:
4.3 Minimum Cost Implementation of Fixed Action Profile i
Given action profile /, the principal's problem is:
(28)
' jeJ k=\
subject to either (El) and (E2), or (Dl) and (D2), depending on the form of implementation.
For all agents k, all action profiles i and all opponent type profiles j _ k , define
P(i)U-k) = Yijk*rk Pif)UkJ-k)»the marginal probability of j _ k given i. Let Pk be the |/| x \j
matrix with typical element p(i)(j_k). For all opponent action profiles /_^,let Pk(Lk) be the
smaller |4 | x \j_k\ matrix with typical element p(ik,Lk){j-k)-
THEOREM 5 If V£, Pk(Lk) has full row rank, then action profile i is implementable in
equilibrium at zero variable cost. If in addition, \fk, Pk has full row rank, then
all action profiles i are implementable in iterated dominance at zero variable cost.
16
 If j k beats j ' k for all j _ k , as in D2', then clearly it beats j ' k on average, whatever the weights therein. Since D2
is essentially such an average, D2' implies D2. Conversely, if j k beats j ' k on some average against all
3{j-k) •""* J-k» a s m ^ ' t n e n ^ b e a t s J'k o n tn^s a v e r a g e against a constant map S(j_k) l—> J_k which takes
each j'_k onto a particular j _ k . Thus it beats j k against j ' k for j _ k . Thus D2 implies D2'.
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Proof: I prove only the iterated dominance result; the equilibrium result is similarly proved.
Take any action profile /. For all k, set ek(j) = e0 for all j and restrict attention to liability
schedules contingent only on opponent reports j _ k , which may be written as (lk(j_k))
Any such liability per evidence schedule trivially satisfies D2. We satisfy Dl for k, if we can
find (Uu)).^ so that Vi; eIt,ViLt el.t,
U , ) ^ - ^ ( 2 9 )
j-k
(The Cj (e0) 's drop out.) By standard linear algebra arguments, this system of / equations in
J_k unknowns has a solution if Pk has full row rank.
_k
17l
Note that adding a constant to the vector (lk(j_k)) does not affect agent k's incentives.
Consequently, Theorem 5 holds even if we impose a system wide expected budget balance
constraint on liability payments: Y.jeJP(})ti)Yl=Mj-k) ^ (o r =) 0 •
4.4 Arbitrarily Low Cost Strict Implementation
The reader may object that under the scheme in the previous subsection the agent is made
indifferent between each alternative action and each alternative report at the hearing. Fixing
17
 That Pk has fiill row rank implies that the matrix with typical element p(ik, i'_k )(j_k ) - p(i'k, i'_k )(/_* ) ,
varying over /' in the rows and j _ k in the columns has rank |/ | — Ik\, precisely the number of its non zero rows.
Let p{i) denote a row of Pk. Then if Pk has full row rank, JT. TTjP^i) = 0 implies n = 0 . Now suppose that
forsome 7T, ^ Z / : nWk (/#*>'-*)-/#*>'-*)) = °- T h e n
Z V nVi, p(ik,i'k)
=
 S t ^ Z ^ ^ ^ j M i . ' - J - Z ^ ^ Z t , ^ / - * ^ * ' ' - * ) - From the full row rank of Pk, this implies that
7tv r = 0 , for all i'k ^  ik and all V_k . This proves that the non zero rows of the matrix in question are linearly
independent.
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indifference among actions is a trivial matter: we just add an s on the right side of (29 ) and
apply the same reasoning. Insuring that agents have a strictly positive incentive to tell the truth
at the hearing is trickier, but still possible.18 The idea is to use slight differential cost signaling—
dormant in the theorem above—to separate slightly and set strict incentives at the hearing.
In order for this to be possible, additional assumptions on evidence costs are required.
Continuous differentiability and genericity will suffice, for this will imply that for each agent,
first differences are consistently and strictly ordered across types in an arbitrarily small
neighborhood of e0. This "local" single crossing property will be sufficient (not necessary) for
existence of a slightly, but strictly separating schedule.
THEOREM 6 Let E be a complete normed vector space. Suppose that \/k, Vjk,j'k, cjk(e) is
cc (e) dc , (e )
continuously differentiable in e at e0 and —J-—— * —Jk . If \/k, Pk(i_k) has
full row rank, then action profile i is strictly implementable in equilibrium at
arbitrarily low variable cost. If in addition, \/k, Pk has full row rank, then all
action profiles i are strictly implementable in iterated dominance at arbitrarily
low variable cost.
Proof: Take any s > 0 and any k. By the full row rank assumption we can find lk(j_k) \-^> $K




 This incentive is important because we rely on the truth of opponent reports in setting each agent's liability.
Contrast this with the single agent model, where indifference at the hearing level is immaterial to enforcement of
actions, since the agent does not change his hearing payoff by choosing another hearing report to which he is
indifferent.
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where lk(j) = lk{j.k) • (Again, the cJk(e0) drop out.) By the continuity of the left hand side in
(the vector) lk(j), we can find a neighborhood B of lk(j), such that Vvt(y) e B,
-EW'^'-tXyO-^.'-JOOKO') >««,-«*« (30)
Now fix any agent k and any profile of opponent types j_k e J_k. By assumption there
cb, (e)
exists some neighborhood D of e0 such that Ve e D, the derivatives — - — have the same strict
de
ordering in jk as at e0. (Without loss of generality, assume that this ordering corresponds to the
labeling jk so that higher types have strictly larger cost derivatives.) This implies that \/s > 0,
we can find a vector lel,...,eJ) such that for all j'k = 1,..., Jk -1, first differences,
cjk vJ'k) ~~ cJk\efk+i) n a v e m e s a m e strict ordered in jk and such that for all jk,j'k =l,...,Jk,
Now s e t / ; = 0 . Next s e t / , , so t ha t / , , - / , <c,[eI , )-c, [e, , but
^ t-i ~ y^t > cj t-i(ej t-i) ~ cj t-i(ey t) • This is possible by the strict ordering on first differences.
This same ordering implies that for all jk<Jk-\, lJk_x - lJk > cJk UjA- ch leJk). Thus, all
types j k <Jk-\ strictly prefer eJk_x to eJk while Jk alone strictly prefers e, to e3 _x.
Continuing inductively, set fJt so that ljk - lJk+l < cJk+l(eJk) - cJk+l(eJk+l), while
hk~hk^>cJk{eJk)~cJk{eh^)' T h e n a 1 1 fk^J'k strictly prefer eJt to eJk+l and all j'k > j k strictly
prefer eJk+l to eJk. Completing this process all the way down to j k = 1, we have that each
individual type j k strictly prefers ejk to all other coordinates in (el,...,eJ). Moreover, each
difference lJk-lJk+l is bounded by cJk(eJk)-cJk(eJk+l) from below and Cjt+l(eJk)-cJk+l(eJk+l) from
above. Then since lJk = 0 and all cAeA are arbitrarily close to cJk(e0), we have that each
-L~cJk{eJk) is arbitrarily close to -cJk(eQ). Therefore, each - ( / ( y ^ ) - ^ ) - ^ ^ ) is
arbitrarily close to -l(j_k)- cJk(e0) M
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5. MULTI -AGENT M O D E L WITH FIXED COSTS AND FILING DECISIONS
The solution in the previous section raises its own puzzle. The mechanism used to
implement at zero variable cost—a mechanism in which there is no costly signaling and only
one's opponents' and not one's own "testimony" affects one's liability—is quite far from what is
actually done in courts of law. Is this because the existing system is not exploiting the benefits
of this sort of mechanism? Or is there some aspect of the how the problem is constructed that
makes its general method of solution inapplicable?
In this section I show how the introduction of filing decisions into the multi agent model
solves this puzzle. When fixed costs of hearings are low, it is costless to have everyone in town
appear in court after the car accident. The appearance of so many types of so many agents
insures that the full rank condition discussed in Section 4 will hold—in words, that we will be
able to implement the target level of care without costly signaling, by conditioning solely on the
reports of second and third parties. As fixed costs increase it becomes more attractive to induce
fewer appearances. At some point, in particular, it will pay to have fewer types appear than is
necessary to guarantee the full row rank condition introduced in the last section. In this case we
may not be able to enforce solely by conditioning liability on the reports of others and will
accordingly need to introduce some differential cost signaling as in the single agent model. As
fixed costs continue to increase we have smaller hearings less often and rely ever more on costly
signaling to separate the agents and thus induce the targeted action in the underlying activity.
To make this point formally, I adopt a structure complex enough to incorporate endogenous
filing, but simple enough to be tractable analytically. The intricacies of forfeiture, joinder, cross
claims, counterclaims and discovery are left for future research. Here there is a single hearing
attended by some endogenously determined subset of the agents. Following choice of action in
the underlying activity and revelation to her (and only her) of her type, each agent decides
individually whether to attend this hearing. Other agents follow the same course simultaneously
and all those who decide to attend gather at an appointed time and place. As in Section 3 there is
a fixed cost c of attendance for each agent and a fixed cost to the court c for each agent that
attends. Thus the more types of more agents that attend the hearing, the higher the expected
fixed costs of the mechanism. The hearing itself proceeds as in the usual direct mechanism.
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Each agent in attendance announces her type and the court then chooses for each a case to
present and an amount of liability.
This endogenous attendance structure has two important characteristics. First, just as in the
single agent model with endogenous filing, types of agents that do not attend the hearing receive
payoffs of zero in the models second phase. (Consequently, if any type of agent k does not
attend, incentive compatibility requires that all types of agent jk that do attend expect to obtain
non negative payoffs by doing so.) The second feature of this structure is related to the existence
of multiple parties and is thus not present in the single agent model. Namely, liability and
evidence for each agent may not differ across opponent types that do not attend the hearing.
More specifically, if both type jk, and type jk, of agent k' do not attend, liability and evidence
for those agents that do attend must be the same across any two type profiles j and j that differ
only in that the k' th coordinate is jk, in one and jk. in the other.
The formal mechanism is as follows. First, the court chooses for each agent k a map
fkUk)•""* "{A*} specifying whether it intends for each type jk to attend the hearing. Whether an
agent attends the hearing, depends then only on her own type, not, as usual, on the profile of
types. The idea is that this choice occurs outside the hearing mechanism and so can not involve
the types of opponents, which this agent does not observe. Concatenating the fk maps yields a
vector map, f(j) = ( / (j\),..., fk (jk),..., fK (jK)). Giveny and a subset of agents, represented by a
K vector / of one'sand zero's, write jf for the projection ofj onto those coordinates k' with
The second half of the mechanism concerns the evidence and liability intended for each
agent at each possible hearing, where hearings are identified by those in attendance. Thus, for
each vector / (i.e. each hearing) and each agent k, we have /#(.//) and £#(.//), the liability and
evidence, respectively, intended for agent k in the hearing identified with / when the type
announcement in that hearing is j f . (Notice that I redundantly specify liability and evidence in
each hearing for all agents, even those that do not attend. This is solely for notational
convenience.)
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In this section I consider only implementation in iterated dominance. The analysis of
equilibrium implementation is essentially the same. Further I consider only the problem of
implementing a particular i at minimal cost. This problem is now:
K ( ^ 1 ^






*)l —/*«(y_*)(•/*'Sa(j_k)\Ja(j_k))) - CA {~eka(j_k)(Jk' ^«(y_,)(Ja(j.k)
Condition (D4) requires explanation. This condition comes into play after actions in the
underlying activity have been taken and type revealed, as each agent k is deciding whether to go
to the hearing and, if so, what type to report there. Fix an agent k and a true type for that agent,
j k . Let us suppose, initially, that we intend for jk to attend the hearing and that there is some
other type j'k that we intend to have not attend the hearing. Hence, fk(jk) = 1 and fk(j'k) = 0 .
The existence of a non attending type j'k means that jk can choose not to attend by imitating j ' k .
Whether it is better to attend the hearing and report the truth, jk or to stay home under the
pretense of being j'k depends on whether jk expects non negative payoffs by attending and
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truthfully reporting. Given our mechanism, this depends in turn on what other agents attend and
what they report about their types. What other agents attend depends jointly on their actual types
j_k and their attendance strategy cc[j_k). What the attending agents say at the hearing depends
also on their actual types and on their reporting strategy S(j_k). Actual type depends in turn on
the action profile i taken in the underlying activity, according to p(i)(j) • The condition (D4 )
says that no matter what the attending and reporting strategy of her opponents and no matter
what the action profile in the underlying activity (i.e. no matter what the distribution on true
types), jk does better attending and reporting her true type then not attending at all. What about
attending and lying about her true type? This is accounted for by comparing expected payoffs
from truth telling against those from pretending to be another type that also attends the hearing.
As in Section 3, the single agent model with optional filing, given the mechanism (f,l,e)
and the action profile i, define variable costs to be
'
 s i m i l a r ly> appearances are
P(f,e,i) = 5]p(0(y)X^*(^) • ^ e ^ e n ^ a v e essentiallythe same theorem as in Section 3 with
jeJ k=\
essentially the same proof:
LEMMA 6 If ( / , /, e) implements action profile i at minimal cost when total appearance costs
are C and (/',/',e') implements action i at minimal cost when total appearance
costs are C>C, then V(f,e,i) < V(f',e',i) and P(f,e,i) > P(f',e',i). If either
(f,l,e) or (/',/', e') is not a least cost implementation given the other's total
appearance costs, then V(f,e,i)<V(f',e',i) and P(f,e,i)>P(f',e',i).
IfC = 0, then (f,l,e) minimizes variable costs V(f,e,i) among all mechanisms
implementing^ 9 /
If C is small and positive, Pk has full row rank for all k, then generically,
Note that the set of mechanisms implementing / is invariant with respect to C, in particular, with respect to c.
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(f,l,e) minimizes appearances P[f,e,i) among all mechanism implementing i at
zero variable cost.
If C is sufficiently large, then ( / , /, e) minimizes appearances P(f, e, i) among
all mechanisms implementing i.
Proof: Omitted. I
Letting P* > 1 be the smallest expected appearances such that action profile i can be
implemented with zero variable costs and letting P >P* be the minimum number of appearances
such that action
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6. CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to analyze the manner in which the civil law sets incentives and it
has taken pains to start from the very foundations of the issue. As a result, many of the
secondary and tertiary phenomena of actual legal process have not been addressed. The real
limits, however, are time and space, for the basic model can incorporate many of these issues.
For example, the forgoing analysis does not explicitly examine the impact of penalties for
perjury. In the model as written, the agents' signaling costs schedules are exogenous. But by
probabilistically punishing certain signals (i.e. fining agents should the court subsequently
observe that they have lied), the civil law is able to in part determine the signaling cost schedules
of agents. Moreover, this paper has not analyzed the impact of the actual civil law practice of
"coupling" liability paid and compensation received. While it is already clear from the
mechanism design analysis that the civil law can do no better with the addition of another
constraint, a careful analysis within the context of this model might teach us something more
about the precise nature of these costs. Most importantly, no mention was made of settlement in
the model presented in these pages. Taking account of the parties' ability to bargain prior to
attending trial might be accomplished by adding a carefully constructed coalitional constraint to
the problem. In addition, the differences between what has been called enforcement by direct
observation versus enforcement by hearing might be more formally explored to gain insight into
the differences between civil and criminal law. In the latter, the state, in some sense, mixes
enforcement by hearing with what it directly (though noisily) observes through prosecutors and
police. Lastly, a more detailed analysis of optimal evidence choice with more general evidence
cost functions might confirm and expand the intuition one gleans from the analysis herein: that
"good" evidence—evidence that should be rewarded with either more compensation or lower
liability—is evidence that is relatively likely to be relatively cheap when the agent takes the
action we wish to enforce.
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7. APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: PROOFS OF LEMMA 1 AND LEMMA 2 IN SECTION 2.1
Both Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 follow from the following Lemma 7.
I will say that the liability per evidence schedule (ll,...,lJ;el,...ieJ) e %{J x EJ is incentive
compatible if it satisfies ( 3 ). I will say that (/,,..., l3; e,,..., e3) eSR"7 x EJ implements type
contingent payoffs (v,,..., vy) e SR"7 if it is incentive compatible and
(32)
Lastly, I will say that (/1,...,/J;e1,...,eJ)e5RJx£'/ implements action i, if it is incentive
compatible (satisfies ( 3 )) and satisfies (2 ).
LEMMA 7 Suppose evidence costs are as in ( 5 ). Then there exists (/,,...,/,) eSR"7 SMC/Z
(/1,...,/y;e1,...,eJ)G^-/xJE-/ implements (v1,...,vJ)e5RJ IF AND ONLY IF
(33)
(34)
Proof: Suppose that (/„...,/,;e,,...,^) eSH17 x £ y implements (v,,...,vy) e^R-7. Then from ( 3 )
and(32), V/ , / = l,...,y,
vr+0" -Mef) ( 3 5
Setting " / ' to j -1 and " f " to j in ( 35 ) yields ( 33 ). Setting "/ ' set to j +1 and " / "toy,
yields (34).
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Conversely, suppose (el,...,eJ) eEJ and (v,,...,vJ) eSK"7 satisfy ( 33 )and ( 34 ). Define
y/ = i,...,y,
lj = -vJ-jc(eJ) ( 3 6 )
From ( 33 ) and ( 34 ),
c(ex) > v, - v2 > c(e2) >v2-v3> c(e3) >...> v ^ - v, > c(ej) ( 37 )
Then V/ , / = 1,..., J with j < f,
V7 - Vf = {VJ ~ V l ) + (Vl - ^ h - ' + l ^ - , - Vr) ( 3 8 )
(39)
( 4 0 )
Substituting ( 32 ) for/ and / yields ( 3 ) . •
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: Suppose (v1,...,vy)e5R</ is implementable with some liability per evidence
schedule. Then the result follows from ( 33 ) and ( 34 ) and the fact that c is nonnegative-
valued. Suppose conversely that (vlv.., v,) e SH"7 satisfies the result. Then since 9?+ c: c(E), we
can find (ex,...,ej) G EJ satisfying ( 37 ) and so ( 33 ) and ( 34 ) . •
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: It suffices to show that if (l,e) implements (v,,..., vy) at minimum cost,
then V/ = l , . . . ,y-l
pu>0=>c{eJ) = 0 (42)
To show (41 ) suppose that for some j <J' - 1 , #, > 0 and c(e7) > vy - vy+1. Since 5R+ e
we can find e'j e E such that cle'\ = Vj - vj+l and then set /J. = -v7 - ycfeO. Then,
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(ll,...,Vj,...,lj\ e$K and (el,...,e'J,...,eJ)ey{+ implement (v15...,vy). But since
c{ej) = vj-vj+l <c(ej) and py>0, (/„...,/;,...,/,) e91 and (e^...,^.,...,*,) e9l+ are less costly
than the hypothesized solution. (42 ) follows since implementation of (v15...,Vj) requires no
lower bound on c(ej) and c(E) = SR+.
APPENDIX B: Deterministic Types in Section 2
A special case of interest is that of deterministic types, where R = (0,...0, 1 ,0,...,0). Here
V 7-7+1 /
necessary and sufficient conditions for implementability have a nice graphical interpretation
which turns on the (local) convexity of private action costs.
COROLLARY 5 With deterministic types, action i is implementable, IF AND ONLY IF
h-av <minar-ai (43)
Proof: The result may be proved directly, but I show that it is a special case of Theorem 1. In the
deterministic case, R. = 0,...,0, 1 ,0,...,0
I-i+l
[Pi Pi-i ••• Pi] is second order stochastically dominated by 0,...,0, 1 ,0,.--,0
and p'P = [pj pj_x ... /?,]. First, I claim that
if and only
7-/+1





. Since 0,...,0, 1 ,2,3,...,/
/-i+l
increases by the maximum increment (i.e., 1)
after / - / +1 , the measure [p{ pj_x ... px ] 's double cumulative vector is vector less than
0,...,0, 1 ,2,3,...,/
7-/+1
, if and only if the last coordinate of [p{ pt_x ... pl ] ' s double
cumulative vector is no less than that for 0,...,0, 1 ,2,3,...,/
7-/+1
, namely /. The last double
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cumulative is of [p{ pt_x ... /?,] is Ipt + (I - 1)/?^+.. .+px = Ep[1,2,3,...,/] and this
completes the claim.
Thus the necessary and sufficient conditions for implementability reduce to the nonexistence
of a measure p such that £p [1,2,3,..., /] > i and p'a < at. Hence, the convex hull of the set
{(/,aj|/ = 1,...,/}, the "graph" of (al9...,aj), is disjoint from the set {(jc,.y)|x >i,y<ai}. A
quick sketch confirms that this is equivalent to what is sought. •
Corollary 6 With deterministic types, all actions i are implementable, IF AND ONLY IF
al-a2>a2-a3>...>aJ_l-aJ. (44)
APPENDIX C: A 3x3 Example Explaining the Basic Considerations in the Single Agent
Mandatory Hearings Model of Section 2
In this example I calculate the
minimum cost implementation of
the second of three actions in a
model with three possible hearing
types. To make the example as
simple as possible I set c(e) = e
and E = 9?+. The parameter


































evidence schedule are given in Table 1. (The answer to the problem is italicized, the parameters
of the problem are not.)
With three actions the linear programming problem stated above reduces to:
+2F22w2 (45)
subject to
(G2l -Gn)w{ +(G22-Gn)w2>a2-al (46)
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where wl = ((v, - v 2 ) - (v 2 - v3)) and w2 = (v2 - v3).










This linear programming problem is
represented in Figure 6. The dotted line
represents constraint (46 ). In order for the
agent to have an incentive to choose action 2
over action 1, wvw2 must be northeast of this
line. The dashed line represents constraint (
47 ); wl,w2 must be southwest of this line if
the agent would choose action 2 over action 3.
These two constraints along with the axes
(which correspond to the non negativity
constraints and thus the constraints on hearing
payoffs) produce a left-skewed triangle of
feasible wvw2 pairs. The solid line
represents the contour of the objective
function at the optimum value. Points southwest of this line yield lower values for the objective
and the reader can see that no such points are feasible. Neither of the non negativity constraints,
(48 ) or (49 ) bind at the optimum, while both (46 ) and (47 ) do bind. Correspondingly,
implementation here occurs with three different cases, one for each type. The highest type's case
is e = 0, as always. The middling type's case is greater than this, since 0 < w2 = (v2 - v3) = e2.
And the lowest type's case is even greater, since 0 < w, = (vj - v2) - (v2 - v3) = ex - e2. The
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If we could see the agent's type,
enforcement of the middling level of care is
trivial. For example, we could punish the
agent if and only if she were of the second
type. Since the middling action puts the least
weight on this type, a sizable punishment
would make the middling action the most
attractive to the agent.
This simple scheme is infeasible,
however, when the only way to condition
payoffs on type is through differential cost
signaling. Then it is not possible to punish
only the middling type, for the highest type's
payoffs must not exceed the middling type's.
The reason, as laid out formally in Error! Reference source not found, has two steps: first, the
middling type must do better by telling the truth than by imitating the highest type; second a
middling type which imitates the highest type will always do better than the highest type who
tells the truth, since its evidence costs are lower. In terms of Figure 6 the scheme of just
punishing the middling type corresponds to making w2 - v2 - v3 sufficiently negative and
w\ = (vi ~~ V2) ~ (V2 ~ V3) positive and larger in absolute value than w2. That this scheme is
infeasible is manifest in its violation of the non negativity constraints on wx and w2. We see
then that not all payoffs that implement the middling action may be generated as the payoffs at a
subsequent hearing.
Now "Plan B" might be to punish the high type along with the middling type. In contrast to
just punishing the middling type these payoffs can be generated at a hearing: when v, is larger
than equal v2 and v3, type contingent payoffs are indeed non increasing and convex. The
problem now is that it is not as obvious that such payoffs can create the proper incentives in the
underlying activity. The potential pitfall is that we over punish the two higher types and thereby
induce the agent to take the highest rather than the middling level of care: when such punishment
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is too great, the increased chance of avoiding punishment by taking the highest level of care will
compensate for the increase in private action costs.
Graphically, we seek a feasible point along the w, axis in Figure 6. That diagram confirms
that we can enforce the middling level of care in this manner so long as we set wY in some
middle range, which corresponds to setting Vj sufficiently above equal v2 and v3, but not too far
above.
We have thus found a way to implement the middling level of care by hearing. But mere
implementation is not our only concern, for we wish to implement at minimum cost. The cost of
implementing middling care by punishing the two highest types is determined by how such
payoff differences are created at the hearing There are many ways, but the cheapest way is given
by the solution to the problem in the previous section, which was substituted to yield the problem
in payoff differences that is now under consideration. With c(e) = e and E = 9t+, the cheapest
implementation of these hearing payoffs is, according to LEMMA 2, to set e3 = 0,
e2 = v2 - v3 = w2 = 0 and ex = (v, - v2) = w} + (v2 -v3) = wl+e2 = wl>0. In this implementation
only the lowest type presents any (positive) evidence and this amount is equal to the w, intercept
in Figure 6. The reason that there is no cheaper implementation of these hearing payoffs is that
we are constrained to set ex > vx - v2 and e2 > v2 - v3, since if, for instance,
el<vl-v2<^>v2<vl-el=lx- 2ex, then the middle type would have an incentive to pretend to
be the lowest.
We have found the cheapest way of implementing the scheme of punishing the two highest
types, but this is not the cheapest cost implementation of middling care. In Figure 6 our current
scheme places us at the wx intercept of the dotted line, the boundary line for the constraint that
middling care is more attractive than low care, despite its higher private action costs. (At this
point, the constraint that middling care be more attractive than the highest level of care does not
bind and so we may ignore it for the moment.) The fact that the objective's contour is steeper
than this boundary tells us that there is a way to increase w2 while simultaneously decreasing wl
so as to lower the expected cost of evidence to an agent who's taken middling care. Increasing
w2 while decreasing wx corresponds roughly to reducing the punishment on the middling type
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holding constant punishment on the high type. The reason that this leads to lower costs is that it
can be accomplished by lowering the evidence presented by the high type (while also raising the
high type's liability so as to keep its payoff constant) while simultaneously increasing the
evidence presented by the middling type and more than compensating for the extra costs by
lowering liability. This in turn leads to a lower cost implementation of the middling level of care
because it substitutes costly signaling by the middle type—a type that rarely occurs after
middling care—for costly signaling by the highest type. This substitution corresponds to moving
toward the northwest along the dotted line starting from its wx intercept.
In the previous paragraph I ignored the possibility that the agent may have an incentive to
take the highest level of care, which as we continue to raise v2 becomes more and more
attractive relative to middling care, since the latter is relatively unaffected by the change. If we
continued the substitution just described, the highest level of care would eventually become most
attractive. Instead, we stop decreasing v2 precisely when we reach the break-even between
middling and high care. This is the optimum depicted in Figure 6.
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